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APPLICATION OF TILE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO
CORPORATIONS: NEW DIRECTIONS AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Communications between an attorney and his client are protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.' Since a client is more likely to
communicate candidly with his lawyer if he knows that information given will
be kept secret,' the law encourages a client to seek professional legal advice by
ensuring the confidentiality of his communications. 3 By protecting the confi-
dentiality of a client's information, however, the privilege often operates as a
bar to discovery of the truth.' In interpreting the scope of the privilege,
courts have attempted to balance the competing interests of encouraging the
resort to legal advice and discovery of the truth by construing the privilege
strictly. 5 In its most common definitional form, the privilege attaches:
if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connec-
tion with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communi-
cation relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) some legal serv-
ices or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings, and not (d) for the
' 8 WIGNIORE EVIDENCE § 2292 at 554 (McNaught rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as IAT1GmoRE1. As to the existence of the privilege and its historical development,
see WiGmoRE §§ 2290, 2291. The privilege now applies in federal courts pursuant to
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which adopts the common law of privilege.
2 See J. WEINSTEIN & M. MERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 11 503 [021 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. WEINSTEIN in turn relies on C. McCoRmicit, Evi-
DENCE § 87 [hereinafter cited as McCoRmicK] (2d ed. 1972). Professor McCormick ob-
serves:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for
the party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the
relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to
change our customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to routine examina-
tion upon the client's confidential disclosures regarding professional busi-
ness. Loyalty and sentiment are silken threads, but they are hard to break.
McCoRmicK at 175-76.
" United States v, Fisher, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Supreme Court pointed
out that:
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could
more readily be obtained from the attorney ... than for himself , the
client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult
to obtain fully informed legal advice. However, since the privilege has the
effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies
only when necessary to achieve its purpose. Accordingly, it protects only
those disclosures—necessary to obtain informed legal advice—which might
not have been made absent the privilege.
Id. at 403.
4 WIGMORF., supra note I, 2291 at 554.
5 Id. Dean Wigmore notes, lilts benefits are all indirect and speculative; its
obstruction plain and concrete „ It ought to be strictly construed within the nar-
rowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." Id.
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purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.'
As set forth in this definition, the attorney-client privilege focuses on the sub-
stance of an individual's communication to his lawyer,' protecting only those
communications involved in seeking advice on an actual legal problem.
A recurring problem arises, however, where the client seeking protection
under the attorney-client privilege is a corporation. 8 Because corporations
speak only through their agents and employees, communications which a cor-
poration seeks to keep confidential do not fit into the precise definition
applicable to individual clients. 9
 Rather, courts must adapt the privilege to
the peculiarities of the corporate form and to its methods of communication.
For the privilege to apply to the corporation qua corporation, the courts must
determine to whom the privilege logically may extend. When, for example, a
corporation requests its attorney to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and
then to advise the corporation regarding liability, communications between
low-level personnel and the attorney are necessary." If discovery devices
subsequently seek to reveal these conversations between lawyer and employee,
a standard for determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
must be established."
In struggling with the issue of the corporate attorney-client privilege,
federal courts have devised two widely used standards. A majority 12 have
6 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (1).
Mass. 1950).
See WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2306-10 at 588-99.
8
 The availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations was defini-
tively established in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 320 F.2d 314,
324 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
" See WEmSTEIN, supra note 2, at VI 503(a)(1)[01], 503(b)[04].
1 " See, e.g., Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir.
1978) and cases cited in notes 12 & 15, infra.
" See FIE. R. Ctv. P. 26, which permits discovery of all 'natters "not
privileged."
12 See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979); In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
remanded on other grounds, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977); Virginia Electric Sc Power
Co. v. Sun Ship Building & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 401 (E.D. Va. 1975); Bur-
lington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D. Md. 1974); Honeywell, Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 119 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Congoleum Industries,
Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 84 (E.1). Pa. 1969); Garrison v. General Motors, 213
F. Supp. 515, 520 (S.D. Cal. 1963); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Power Co.,
211 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Del, 1962); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration, 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom.
General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
943 (1963).
The control group test also was recommended by the Judicial Conference of the
United States as the appropriate means of applying the attorney-client privilege to
corporations in Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magis-
trates, 96 F.R.D. 161, 249-51 (1969). See Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule
5-03(a)(3), 46 F.R.D. at 252-53. These proposed rules were submitted to Congress by
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adopted the "control group" test developed in City of Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Electric Corporation." This standard protects communications between a
corporate attorney and individual officers and employees of the firm with
authority to act upon the lawyer's advice.' 4 A significant minority of the
jurisdictions,' 5 however, have adopted the "subject matter" test first enun-
ciated by the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Roe Publishers Inc. v. Decker." The
Harper test protects communications made by an employee at the direction of
his or her superior concerning duties or acts within the scope of his or her
employment.' 7
Neither test has withstood criticism well." As a result, federal courts
now are experimenting with new standards to remedy the perceived defects in
the two major tests. Dissatisfaction with both the "control group" and the
"subject matter" tests has spawned at least three recent variations on the same
theme.' 9 Under these experimental tests, courts are struggling to extend the
privilege to encourage greater reliance on professional legal advice while pre-
venting an interpretation of the privilege which would threaten to keep all
corporate affairs permanently secret. 2 " This struggle for revision is occur-
ring, moreover, while the very existence of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate sector is under assault. Recent proposals to amend the Code of
Professional Responsibility " and regulations of the Securities Exchange
the Supreme Court. Congress, however, amended the rules before granting its ap-
proval. See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (adopting
FED. R. Evin. 501, which embraces the common law of privilege). For a discussion of
the rule as adopted, and the reason for the congressional changes, see H.R. REP. No's.
93-650 and 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7075, 7082, 7098, 7100; S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 7051, 7058.
13 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
312 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963) [hereinafter cited as City
of Philadelphia].
' 4 City of Philadelphia, supra note 13, at 485.
15 See, e.g., Harper & Roe Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92
(7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v.
lmoco-Gateway Corp. 62 F.R.D. 454, 456-57 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th
Cir. 1976); Hasso v. Retail Credit Company, 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
18 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
11 423 F.2d at 491-92.
' 8 See, e.g., Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corpo-
rations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 362-71 (1972); Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 432-34
(1970); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach,
69 Micut. L. REV. 360, 369-74 (1970).
19 See Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir.
1977) (modified subject matter test preventing dissemination of information beyond
those with "need to know"); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385
(D.D.C. 1978) (relating communication to decision-making process on legal advice).
2° See United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979) (concern
that attorneys for corporations not become the "exclusive repository of unpleasant
facts.").
2 ' See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND EVALUATION, Draft Code of
Professional Responsibility, reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, August 27, 1979, pas-
sim.
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Commission 22 question the very values which the attorney-client privilege
seeks to protect." The tensions on the privilege in terms of its scope, its
nature, and its future effectiveness, thus have aroused the interest of both the
corporate and legal communities."
This note will examine the policy conflicts manifested in alternative ap-
proaches to the corporate attorney-client privilege. First, the note will analyze
in detail the established "control group" and "subject matter" tests. This
analysis will focus both on the principles underlying each standard and the
effects which each test produces. Next, the note will scrutinize three recent
decisions, Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 25 Diversified Industries Inc. v.
Meredith,'" and In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 27
 which present modifica-
tions to the traditional approaches of the federal courts. They will be
examined for their compliance with the purpose underlying the attorney-
client privilege and for the opportunity for reform which each represents.
Finally, a new approach combining aspects of two recent tests will he
suggested. It will be submitted that an unambiguous standard which closely
relates application of the privilege to the reason for a corporate employee's
communication with an attorney permits extension of the privilege to the cor-
poration qua corporation. Thus, the proposed test presents the most predict-
able and practical method of serving the purposes of the corporate attorney-
client privilege.
I. THE ESTABLISHED STANDARDS
A. The Control Group Test
In applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations, federal courts
historically relied upon the definition and application of the privilege set forth
by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation. 28 In
United Shoe, the district court held that where "letters to or from independent
lawyers were prepared to solicit or give an opinion on law or legal services,
such parts of them are privileged as contain, or have opinions based on, in-
22
 The Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown University Law
Center proposed an amendment to the Rules of Practice of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission which would require attorneys to disclose their knowledge of
wrongdoing under the federal securities laws. SEC RELEASE No, 34-16045, July 31,
1979.
2 " As noted, the attorney-client privilege encourages clients to seek the assist-
ance of counsel. To the extent that the proposals would require attorneys to disclose
information obtained in confidence, the values served by the privilege are under-
mined.
" See 66 A.B.A. J. 23 (January, 1980). The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari on United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979). United States v.
Upjohn, No. 79-886 (March 17, 1980). For the reasons expressed in the text accom-
panying notes 73-89 infra, this note argues that the Court should reverse the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Upjohn.
26
 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975).
26
 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
27
 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
28
 89 F, Stipp. 357, 358-59 (0. Mass. 1950).
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formation furnished by an officer or employee of the ... [corporation] in confi-
dence and without the presence of third persons."'" Thus, courts following
United Shoe permitted extension of the privilege to any corporate employee
provided his or her confidential communication involved the rendering of
legal advice."
This broad extension of the attorney-client privilege to corporations
created two problems. First, broad extension of the privilege did not relate
application of the privilege to the underlying purpose of encouraging the solic-
itation of legal advice.'" All corporate communications arguably fell within
the United Shoe ambit, whether intended for a particular legal purpose or not.
Second, the United Shoe approach ignored dictum from Hickman v. Taylor, 32 in
which the Supreme Court of the United States observed that communications
of corporate employee witnesses to corporate activity were not protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 33 By extending a client-attorney privilege to all
corporate employees, the United Shoe court clearly contradicted the Supreme
Court's statement in Hickman. Thus, the formulation of the corporate
attorney-client privilege announced by Judge Wyzanski was insufficient; the
standard's overbreadth shielded too many corporate employee communica-
tions.
The problems of United Shoe led federal courts to adopt new means of
construing the attorney-client privilege as it applies to corporations. In City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," Judge Kirkpatrick of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania fashioned a rule that. restricted the traditional applica-
tion of the privilege when asserted by a corporation. In that case, the city of
Philadelphia sued Westinghouse, General Electric (GE), Allis-Chalmers and
other corporations, alleging overpricing of certain products. 35
 During
pre-trial discovery, the city sought memoranda of conversations between de-
fendant General Electric's counsel and several GE employees accused of
wrongdoing. Memoranda of conversations between defendant Allis-Chalmers'
2" Id. at 359 (emphasis supplied).
" See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Stipp. 251, 252
(N.D.N.Y. 1960); Zenith Radio Corp. of America,' 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.Del. 1954);
Note. The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 360, 367, 369-71 (1970).
' See WEINYTEIN, supra note 2, at 503(b)104].
" 2 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). In Hickman, employees of a tugboat company
were interviewed by the firm's attorney about an accident; the employees had survived
the sinking of their lug. The court held that the attorney's memoranda of their con-
versations were protected as "work product" of the attorney, and discoverable only
upon a showing of good cause. Id. at 5:1. The holding has now been codified in FED.
R. CR% P. 26(h)(3).
33
 The court stated, "the memoranda	 fall outside the scope of the
attorney-client privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on that hasis....
For present purposes. it suffices to note that the protective cloak of the privilege does
not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for
his client in anticipation of litigation." 329 U.S. at 508.
'' City of Philadelphia, supra note 13, at 485.
3 ' See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Stipp. 486,
487 (F.D. Pa. 1962) [hereinafter cited as City of Philadelphia 11].
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attorney and that company's employees also were sought. 36
 Both GE and
Allis-Chalmers attempted to prevent discovery of the documents, arguing that
the memoranda were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client priv-
ilege."
In reaching its decision that the memoranda were not entitled to the pro-
tection of the attorney-client privilege," the City of Philadelphia court focused
on the single question which it felt must be answered in applying the privilege
to corporations, and which analogized the corporate client's privilege to that
held by individual clients. The court asked, "[i]s it the corporation seeking the
lawyer's advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?" To
answer this fundamental question, the court considered the United Shoe for-
mulation of the privilege, 40 and the dictum from Hickman v. Taylor which the
United Shoe court had ignored.'" According to the City of Philadelphia court,
the approach adopted in United Shoe was overly broad. 42 The court appar-
ently feared that application of the attorney-client privilege to an "extremely
broad class" 43
 of employees would permanently insulate corporate affairs
from the discovery process of litigation. Moreover, Judge Kirkpatrick noted
that any extension of the attorney-client privilege to such classes of employees
would conflict with Hickman v. Taylor. 44 Reading Hickman as distinguishing
statements made by clients and statements made by employees of clients,'" the
court observed that the attorney-client privilege could not extend to mere
employee witnesses to corporate acts.'" Since the United Shoe formulation ex-
tended the privilege to all corporate employees—including mere employee
witnesses—the court noted that the Hickman dictum was contradicted. The
Citv of Philadelphia court therefore concluded that the United Shoe test was un-
satisfactory, 47
 and that a different, qualified approach was required."
In devising its new approach, the court recalled the fundamental question
whether the corporation qua corporation was seeking advice when the assert-
edly privileged communication was made." It determined that an affirma-
tive answer to this question is possible only when the individual communicat-
ing with the corporation's lawyer is in a position to act upon the attorney's
advice." The court thus held that for the privilege to attach, only those
36
 City of Philadelphia, supra note 13, at 484.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 486.
38 Id. at 485 (emphasis supplied).
40 Id.
41
 See notes 32 and 33 supra.
42
 Cite of Philadelphia, supra note 13, at 485.
43 Id,
44 Id.
43 Id.
48 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
" Id.
an Id. The court stated:
if the employee making the communication ... is in a position to control
or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the
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officers and employees with decision-making authority are sufficiently iden-
tified with the immediate legal problem." In any other case, the employee-
communicator merely provides information which the lawyer may or may not
use in counseling his client. 52 The "control group" test established by the City
of Philadelphia court thus restricts the scope of the corporate attorney-client
privilege suggested by United Shoe; the United Shoe problems of overbreadth
are minimized. Moreover, by applying the privilege to the corporation qua
corporation, a standard for corporate clients more closely analogous to the
privilege available to individual clients is defined.
Since its formulation in the City of Philadelphia decision, the control group
test has gained broad judicial support. 55
 Recently, two other courts have
applied the standard to corporations seeking the protection of the attorney-
client privilege. In In re Grand fury Investigation, 54
 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit endorsed the view taken by its district court in City
of Philadelphia and adopted the control group test. In Grand Jury, the de-
fendant, Sun Company, requested its attorney to investigate allegations of il-
legal foreign payments made by corporate employees." The law firm which
conducted the investigation and advised the company regarding liability
claimed that documents prepared during the course of its investigation were
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. 56 In holding that
the documents were not privileged, the appeals court adopted the control
group approach. 57 The court noted that while the control group standard
had been criticized," the fundamental idea underlying the test was sound: the
standard restricted application of the privilege so that it "shelters only those
communications that ... [are] socially desirable to protect." 59 As applied to
communications made by low-level employees to a corporation's attorney in-
vestigating possible wrongdoing, the court found that extension of the
privilege was not socially desirable."
In holding that Sun Company's documents were not protected from dis-
closure by the attorney-client privilege, the court focused on the nature of
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, 	 he is (or per-
sonifies) the corporation when he makes the disclosure to the lawyer and
the privilege would apply.
Id.
61 Id. See also Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The
Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 428, 432 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HAR-
VARD NOTE].
52 City of Philadelphia, supra note 13, at 485.
" See HARVARD NOTE, supra note 51, at 429, and cases cited at note 12 supra.
54 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
66 Id. at 1227.
56
 Id. at 1228.
57 Id. at 1237.
58 Id. at 1235-37.
59 Id. at 1235, quoting Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 365-66 (1972).
60 599 F.2d at 1237. The court emphasized that communications which were
"socially desirable" to protect were those made by an individual authorized to act upon
the lawyer's advice. Id. at 1235.
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communications between corporate employees and corporate attorneys, and
upon the relationship between attorneys and their corporate clients." First,
the court reasoned that although an attorney needs to secure information
from outside the control group to offer informed legal advice, 12 the privilege
is not essential to this information gathering process." 3 Rather, because the
corporation holds the privilege, and thus may waive it, the privilege's assur-
ance of confidentiality is a mere illusion to communicating employees.
Employees involved in wrongdoing communicate with an investigating attor-
ney at their own risk if corporate managers later may waive the privilege,"
while innocent employees have no fear of confiding in corporate counsel.`'
Since an attorney's ability to secure information thus would not be hampered
by the unavailability of the privilege, its extension to low-echelon employees is
neither necessary nor desirable." Second, the court noted that the limit. on
the scope of the privilege provided by the control group test did not discour-
age corporate managers from soliciting legal assistance, as alleged by critics.'''
Instead, the court. reasoned, corporations have "little choice."" Although the
privilege's protection might make investigations to ensure compliance with
complex regulatory laws more "palatable,"" the court speculated that "the
potential costs of undetected non-compliance are themselves high enough to
ensure that corporate officials will authorize investigations regardless of an
inability to keep such investigations completely confidential." " Since corpo-
rations were "unlikely to risk ... liability ... by foregoing introspection," 71
the court concluded that the control group test did not operate as a disincen-
tive to internal fact finding. 72
 Extension of the privilege would yield no addi-
tional or more useful information to the attorney than could be obtained
under the more restrictive standard, yet it would deny discovery of such in-
formation to judicial fact finders. The Grand Jury court thus found that exten-
sion of the corporate attorney-client privilege to Sun Company's employees'
conversations was unwarranted and that the restrictive control group standard
was appropriate for modern corporations.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also recently indicated its en-
dorsement. of the control group test. In United States v. Upjohn, 73 the court
declined to protect documents prepared by the defendant corporation's attor-
"I Id. at 1236.
"' Id.
1i3
"I Id.
"' Id.
"7 Id. at. 1237.
""
"" Id.
7" Id. In the next breath, however, the court questioned its own speculation,
noting that "application of the control group test „ . [might] result in less frequent use
of attorneys as corporate sleuths." Id.
" Id.
72 hi.
7' 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, United States v. Upjohn. No.
79-886 ( 3 arch 17, 1980).
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ney while investigating allegations that employees had bribed foreign govern-
ment officials.?" In reaching its decision, the court focused on the problems
it perceived extension of the privilege beyond corporate decision makers
would effect, and adopted the limited control group standard. Although not-
ing that corporate clients can communicate with their attorneys only through
agents and employees, 75 the court reasoned, first, that extension of the
privilege would defeat its underlying purpose of encouraging clients to solicit
legal advice."t Ultimately, the court found, corporate managers would be dis-
suaded from asking attorneys to conduct factual investigations if the privilege
extended to low-echelon employees. 77 Since litigants would have difficulty
obtaining information gleaned from privileged investigations, an enterprise's
exposure to liability would he minimized. Managers consequently could avoid
ordering internal investigations at little risk and thus shield themselves from
information about possibly illegal transactions. 78 The court therefore deter-
mined that extension of' the privilege's scope would encourage corporate offi-
cials to ignore "important information they have good business reasons to
know and use." 771 Second, the court observed that extending the privilege
would have the effect of funneling corporate information about questionable
activities to corporate counsel for concealment." If communications between
attorneys and low level employees were protected front disclosure, corporate
attorneys might become the "exclusive repository of unpleasant facts." 81 The
court feared that the discovery burden imposed upon litigants would thus
become overly severe. Because such a discovery burden would create broad
"zones of silence"" for fact finders, the court adopted the more restrictive
control group approach.
While U.S. v. Upjohn and In re Grand fury Investigation are manifestations
of the support which the control group test has received, each case also re-
veals the flaws of the standard. For, while each decision reasoned carefully
that a broad extension of the privilege in the corporate setting would need-
lessly overprotect information, documents or wrongdoing, neither case sets
out a means of applying the privilege in the corporate context that is distinctly
related to the purpose underlying the rule, or to corporate purposes in per-
forming internal investigations. Both Upjohn and Grand Jun, are concerned
with the privilege's goal of encouraging clients to solicit. professional legal ad-
vice, yet reach dramatically opposite conclusions about the effects of extend-
ing the privilege's scope. The Grand Jun court's view argues that internal fact
finding will proceed notwithstanding the unavailability of the privilege, and
that extension is therefore unnecessary." The Upjohn court, conversely, takes
74
 Id. at 1225.
75
 Id. at 1226.
7 " Id. at 1 99 7.
77 Id.
7 " Id,
7 `I
80 id .
81 Id.
82 Id., citing Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65
YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956).
83 See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
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the unique view that extension itself inhibits introspection, and that limits
therefore should be imposed." That the same result can be reached from
such opposite reasoning indicates that neither court fully understands the true
nature and purpose of corporate introspection. Informed advice on com-
pliance with regulations and correction of problems depends upon counsel's
knowledge of facts held only by low-level employees. If the corporate purpose
in conducting an internal investigation is legitimately related to legal prob-
lems, failure to extend the privilege to communications by low. level employees
contradicts the privilege's goal of encouraging the resort to effective legal ad-
vice. Indeed, this contradiction is especially apparent in the compliance inves-
tigation context presented in these cases, because of the corporation's inability
to meet complex regulatory directives without professional assistance. 85 The
courts' failure to accord any protection to the attorneys' documents therefore
foils the corporate purpose in performing compliance investigations and relies
on sheer speculation about a corporation's response to the availability vet non
of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, neither decision precisely defines
the applicability of its standard; no accurate definition of membership in the
control group is provided." The ambiguity of a term of art such as "control
group" is apparent. Without a predictable means of attaching the privilege to
corporate communicators, any standard is likely to fail."
B. The Subject Matter Test
Criticism of the control group test led the Seventh Circuit to adopt a
broader and less restrictive test in Harper & Roe Publishers, Inc. v. Decker. 88 In
Harper, a corporate antitrust defendant, Harper & Roe, sought mandamus to
vacate a district court order compelling production of documents containing
employee-attorney communications."" Harper & Roe attorneys had inter-
" See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
85 Were the investigations to have been conducted in anticipation of litigation
instead of prospectively for compliance purposes, a qualified privilege would be avail-
able. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Indeed,
in Grand Jun!, with respect. to sonic documents, the court indicated that Sun Com-
pany's anticipation of litigation was strong. 599 F.2d at 1229. By failing to accord any
protection to these documents, however, courts following the control group approach
lift an otherwise difficult discovery burden; litigants may thus proceed on "wits bor-
rowed from [one's] adversary." 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
8" Indeed, in Upjohn, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court for consideration of which officials' communications might still be protected
under the control group test. 600 F.2d at 1228.
8 7 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 11503(b)[04]. See also HARVARD NOTE, supra
note 51 at 426-27 (suggesting "bright line" test to define privilege precisely). The
troublesome nature of defining membership in the control group is evident in cases
adopting that standard. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (divi-
sion managers and assistant division managers); Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF,
49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (corporation vice-presidents, division vice-presidents, and
general managers); Garrison v, General Motors, 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
(directors, officers, department heads, division managers and first assistant division
managers, and division chief engineers).
" 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
89
 423 F.2d at 490. The memoranda were sought pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
34.
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viewed employees after their testimony before a grand jury investigating as-
pects of the publishing industry."" In granting mandamus, and thereby pre-
venting discovery of the documents, the Seventh Circuit relied on two ideas.
First, the court noted that the control group test was not "wholly
adequate."' Observing that the test had been criticized in learned commen-
tary," the court held that the privilege extended to individuals outside the
control group and concluded that a broader test was required." 3 In response
to criticism of the control group standard, the court felt that internal corpo-
rate investigations were essential to management of the modern corporation.
Extension of the privilege to communications between attorneys and
employees necessary to the resolution of an immediate legal problem was thus
appropriate. As applied to the "debriefing" of employees who had appeared
before the grand jury," the nexus between the conversations and a corporate
decision on legal advice was sufficiently close to invoke the privilege." The
Harper court concluded that communications with employees would be
privileged if made at the direction of a superior and if the communications
concerned matters within the scope of the employee's duties." The court's
test thus relied not upon the status of the communicator-employee, but upon
the "subject matter" of the communication. 97
Second, the court considered the problem of statements made by by-
stander witnesses to corporate activity, the issue which had motivated the City
of Philadelphia court to formulate the control group test." The Harper court
read Hickman v. Taylor as denying protection to statements made by corporate
employees fortuitously observing corporate acts." The court reasoned that
its subject matter test, by contrast, would apply when employee-
"" 423 F.2d at 490.
"' Id. at 491.
12 Id. The court noted in particular the case of D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964).
In Chadbourne, the Supreme Court of California attempted to analogize application of
the corporate attorney-client privilege to the privilege enjoyed by individuals. The
court concluded that the privilege would apply if the employee-communicator was the
"natural person" to he speaking for the corporation. 60 Cal. 2d at 736, 388 P.2d at
709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477. In reaching this decision, the court focused on the intent of
the parties—corporation and employee—in making the communication. To the extent
that their intentions were related to the resolution of a particular legal problem, the
privilege would apply. 60 Cal. 2c1 at 738-39, 388 P.2d at 710, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 478. See
also Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and
"Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 545-48 (1968); Heininger, The Attorney-Client
Privilege as it Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. B.J. 376, 384 (1965); Maurer, Privileged
Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352, 375 (1967).
"3 423 F.2d at 491.
14 Id. at 490.
"5 Id. at 491.
"" Id. at 491-92.
97 The characterization of Harper's rule as a "subject matter" test has been
widespread. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165
(D.S.C. 1975).
"8 423 F.2d at 491. The court noted that, in the case at bar, they were "not
dealing with the communications of employees about matters as to which ... the
employees] are virtually indistinguishable from bystander witnesses ...." Id.
"" Id. See also note 33 supra.
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communicators were corporate actors, not corporate witnesses.'°° Since the
test permitted the privilege to attach only to communications involving an
employee's duties, it would, by definition, involve only communications relat-
ing to an employee's acts. Thus, the Harper test avoided the problems of
Hickman's dictum, while expanding the scope of the corporate privilege. The
Supreme Court., in an equally divided per curiam decision, affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's opinion.'"'
As with the control group test enunciated in City of Philadelphia, the sub-
ject matter test announced in Harper spawned critical comment.'" Several
courts adopted the Harper reasoning; 1"3 others expressly rejected it.' 04 In its
attempt to relate more closely the communications of corporate attorneys to
the purpose of encouraging the solicitation of legal advice, the Harper subject
matte!' test was a step in the right direction. Focusing on the substance of a
communication offers a better approach to determining how the attorney-
client privilege should be applied to the unique situations and requirements of
a modern corporation. Since corporate managers and decision makers fre-
quently do not possess complete and detailed information about all corporate
activity, some extension of the privilege beyond the control group is desirable.
Such application offers several positive benefits. First, it provides more infor-
mation to attorneys than might be gleaned absent the privilege; attorneys are
thus more likely to offer more informed and reasoned advice. Second, it as-
sists in informing management of information about wrongdoing. Since all
communications are protected, it is more likely that facts relating to question-
able activity actually will be transmitted to corporate management. Thus, the
test relates attorney-employee communications to the privilege's purpose of
encouraging clients to seek legal help. Finally, the subject matter standard
permits a more precise analogy between the scope of the privilege extended
to individual clients and that accorded the corporate client. In both cases,
communications are protected on the basis of their substance. The analogy
offered by the control group test, by contrast, works imprecisely. An individu-
al's communications arc not protected on the basis of the communicator's
status as at e the corporate client's communications under the control group
test. By looking at both information "givers" and "deciders," 1 "5 the subject
matter test. makes comparison to individual clients more exact. Ultimately,
such analogy is appropriate; the privilege attaches only to the corporation qua
corporation.
tm 423 F.2d at 491-92.
"" 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
" 2 See, e.g.. HARVARD NoTr_orpra note 51. at 432-34.
'''" See note 15 supra.
"" See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2(1 1223. 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) (both cases specifically
rejecting Harper). See also Federal Trade Commission v. Lukens Steel Co., 444 F. Supp.
803, 807 n.4 (D.D.C. 1977) (acknowledging the split in circuits between the "control
group- and "subject matter . ' tests without deciding which test to adopt); Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C.
1977) (same).
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach,
69 Mien. L. REV, 360, 374 (1970).
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Despite the attempt to relate attachment of the privilege more closely to
the purpose underlying the rule and to a more precise analogy to individual
clients, the Harper test is not without its critics. In its broad application, the
Harper subject matter standard might be unpredictable and unworkable.'"
Since the test first requires that communications be made only at the direction
of a superior, attorneys conducting corporate investigations would have to
consult a variety of middle management personnel to be sure that each
employee communicating with him did so only at the request of a superior.
Complete knowledge of corporate structure and a workable definition of
"superior" are therefore essential to the preservation of the privilege.' Ab-
sent such knowledge or such a definition, the privilege might extend to any
employee. This would strain the relationship required between the assertedly
privileged communication and the rendering of legal advice which is the es-
sence of the privilege in any context. More importantly, however, for those
corporations that successfully meet Harper's two step approach to attachment
of the privilege, the standard might permit corporations to "funnel" informa-
tion through their attorneys, and thus escape disclosure indefinitely. As the
court in Upjohn later lamented, corporate attorneys might become the "exclu-
sive repository of unpleasant facts. " 10A A corporate manager could circum-
vent the purpose of the privilege and liberal discovery rules by ensuring that
the two simple aspects of the subject matter test.'" had been met.
The subject matter standard announced in Harper thus suffers from prob-
lems similar to those confronted by the control group approach. The two
standards are somewhat unpredictable because they ambiguously suggest indi-
vidual corporate officials to whom protection may extend. Moreover, the
standards fail to balance appropriately a corporation's needs for introspection
and low-level information against the burden of discovery imposed on oppos-
ing litigants. Finally, and most significantly, neither standard articulates a
method for attaching the privilege to corporations which distinctly relates the
substance and transmittal of corporate information to a corporate decision on
legal advice. It is this element which defines the correct application of the
privilege in a manner consistent with its underlying principles.
11. NEW DIRECTIONS
Because of flaws in both the control group and subject matter tests, a few
courts recently have experimented with new standards. Although most circuit
courts still cling to the established methods of applying the attorney-client
privilege to corporations,'" three recent decisions indicate a willingness on
the part of judges to fashion a rule which more closely relates application of
the privilege in the corporate setting to its goal of encouraging clients to seek
professional legal assistance. This section of the note will examine those deci-
sions, and their attempts to extend the privilege where socially desirable, while
"6 See WEINSTEIN, SUprel note 2, at 11503(1)[041.
'"' See 11 CO N. L. REV. 94, 103 (1978).
"8 600 F.2d at 1227.
10" 423 F.2d at 491-92.
"° See notes 12 and 15 supra.
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preventing a universal interpretation of the privilege which would make all
corporate documents and communications immune from discovery.
A. The Combination Approach
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,"' a patent owner invoked the
protection of the attorney-client privilege for some 4,500 documents sought
by former patent licensees in multi-district antitrust litigation. 12
 The District
Court for South Carolina applied both the control group and subject matter
tests seriatim to determine if the documents were privileged." 3 The Duplan
court thus devised a combination test, viewing the subject matter and control
group tests as necessary corollaries of each other. 14 In formulating this ap-
proach, the court noted that a corporation cannot function without many in-
dividuals at many levels possessing important information. 15 For an attorney
to render useful advice, the court reasoned, he must be able to speak with all
of these people in the strictest confidence."" Otherwise, the court felt, cor-
porations would be reluctant to divulge information, and indeed, might hesi-
tate to seek legal advice.'" In analyzing the subject matter and control group
tests, the court determined that each test, standing alone, did not sufficiently
relate attachment of the privilege to the decision making process involved in
rendering legal advice."' The court concluded that combining aspects of the
two tests would be more effective.'"
The Duplan court reasoned that the "main consideration is whether the
particular representative of the client, to whom or from whom the communi-
"' 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1979).
"2 Id. at 1156.
13 Id. at 1163. Having devised its test, the court. subsequently ordered the par-
ties to submit lists to the court of documents for which a privilege was still asserted
under the adopted 'standard. Id. at 1157.
14 Id. at 1165.
15 Id. at 1164. The court was particularly concerned with the modern corpora-
tion and the problems attendant to it. It therefore decided to take "a common sense
look at the practicalities of the 'control group' test and its applicability in the day-to-
day workings of a lawyer." The court then observed:
Obviously, if a corporation needs legal advice it cannot deal solely through
the chairman and the board of directors. There has to be a sufficient
number of persons within a corporation who are authorized on behalf of
the corporation to seek advice, to give information with respect to the ren-
dition of advice, and to receive advice ....
If only one, two, three, or four persons within a corporate structure
could be the corporation when it must seek legal advice, then, for all prac-
tical purposes, any corporation would not have an effective attorney-client
privilege.
Id.
"6 Id.
Id. The court pointed out the danger of preventing attorneys from speaking
with information holders because of the unavailability of the privilege. The court
reasoned that corporations would become "reluctant to seek help absent the privilege's
protection." Id.
"8 Id. at 1165.
"9 Id.
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cation is made, is involved in rendering information necessary to the
decision-making process concerning a problem on which legal advice is
sought."'" Duplan interpreted the control group test broadly, as extending
to lower echelon employees where the individual employee provided access to
information essential to giving legal advice. 12 ' The court observed, however,
that such an application of the control group test did not determine which
lower level employee commnications would be sufficiently identified with a
particular legal problem for the privilege to attach. For guidance, the Duplan
court turned to the Harper subject matter test, which it characterized as a
"necessary corollary" to the control group approach.'" The Duplan court
determined that the subject matter standard announced in Harper imposed
the additional requirement that the subject matter of an employee-attorney
communication concern the performance of the worker's duties.'" Thus,
under the standard articulated in Duplan, a communication between an attor-
ney and a corporate employee would be privileged if it were necessary to the
rendering of legal advice to the corporate control group, and if it involved the
activities of the employee during the course and within the scope of his
employment.' 24 The Duplan standard therefore looks first at the control
group to determine if a legitimate request for legal advice has been initiated,
and second, the standard evaluates the substance of an employer's communi-
cation. If the communication is related to one's duties of employment, the
Duplan standard presumes it is linked to the rendering of legal advice.
Although the Duplan court misread the control group and subject matter
tests, 123 the court's ultimate approach is sound. The City of Philadelphia control
group test and the Harper subject matter test each inadequately protect
employee communications to a corporation's attorney that are necessary to an
informed legal opinion. Duplan's standard, by contrast, notes that information
120 Id.
' 2 ' Id.
122 Id. The court noted that even where the individual communication contains
information necessary to renderiiig legal advice, the privilege required more accurate
characterization. Id. This would be true because, as the court pointed out, "one can
envision that in some situations, the attorney has to go far down in the ranks; in other
instances, the attorney can obtain the necessary information close to the top. The ex-
tent of the attorney-client privilege will vary with the individual situation; the climates
are seldom identical." Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Duplan appears to characterize the control group and subject matter tests
erroneously. City of Philadelphia proposed the control group standard as a necessary
qualification to the extension of the attorney-client privilege permitted for corpora-
tions under earlier definitions; it was not intended, as the Duplan court apparently
reads it, to permit extension beyond corporate employees with actual authority to act.
upon legal advice. Similarly, Harper was not intended as a "necessary corollary - to the
control group standard, but as an alternative to it. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Liti-
gation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 386-87 (D.D.C. 1978). Harper rejected the limited extension of
the attorney-client privilege to corporate decision makers because of the imperfect
analogy to individual clients which it offered, and because of the disincentives to the
solicitation of legal advice which it effected. The two standards, although premised on
the same principles, achieve radically different results and intend different objectives.
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held only by employees is essential to corporate counsel. The court then recog-
nizes that extension of the privilege is necessary to accommodate the prac-
ticalities of the modern corporation. The test is thus superior to the restrictive
control group approach because it allows such information to be obtained.
Moreover, by requiring that information provided by employees be necessary
to rendering legal advice, the test recognizes that a close relationship between
a communication and a corporate legal decision is necessary to strictly con-
strue the privilege. The standard is therefore superior to the broad brush
approach of the subject matter test. The test thus represents a significant step
toward a standard which can clarify a confused area of the law. The Duplan
opinion, however, fails to set forth an explicit rule governing application of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting ' 26
 and does not require
that the relationship between an employee communication and a legal deci-
sion be precisely drawn. Although Duplan's reasoning is sound, a better ap-
proach would mold the Duplan reasoning into an easily followed, bright line
rule of law which traces application of the privilege from initiation to com-
munication to decision.
B. The Need to Know Approach
A second approach relating protection of employee-attorney communica-
tions to the purposes underlying the attorney-client privilege was taken in
Diversed Industries Inc. v. Meredith. 727 In that case, the Weatherhead Com-
pany sued Diversified, alleging that Diversified had bribed the plaintiff's
employees to induce them to accept inferior grades of Diversified's cop-
per. 12 " During pre-trial discovery, the plaintiff sought to discover
memoranda prepared by a law firm retained by Diversified to conduct an
internal investigation of employee activities. 12" In an en banc opinion,' 30 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the documents were pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. 131
In reaching this decision, the Diversified court observed that the reasoning
behind the subject matter test was superior to that underlying the control
group standard."' The court reasoned that because Harper's subject matter
standard focused upon "why an attorney was consulted, rather than with
12" The notion that a "bright line" test is essential to proper application of the
attorney-client privilege is derived from two principles. First, of course, the conflicting
objectives and effect of the privilege prompt its strict construction. See note 5 supra
and accompanying text: HARVARD NOTE,. supra note 51, at 426. More important, how-
ever, is the predictability such a test would offer corporate attorneys and judges in
asserting and applying the privilege. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at ¶ 503(b)[04].
'" 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
129 572 F.2d at 607.
129 Id .
13" A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit initially
rejected Diversified's assertion of privilege. 572 F.2d 596 (Heaney, J., concurring and
dissenting in part). The case was ultimately decided, however, in an en banc opinion
written by Judge Heaney after rehearing by the full court.
' 3 ' 572 F.2d at 611.
132 Id. at 609.
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whom the attorney communicated," 133 the subject matter standard more
closely related protected communications to the object of encouraging cor-
porations to seek legal help. 134 The court noted, however, that a modifica-
tion of the Harper standard was necessary to cure its potential for abuse. Spe-
cifically, the court feared that the Harper court's failure to guard the
confidentiality of all employee-attorney communications would permit the "fun-
neling" of information to corporate counsel for concealment.' 35 The court de-
termined that a means of relating communications to decisions on legal advice
would prevent such abuse of the privilege, and that this could be ac-
complished by modifying the subject matter test to prevent dissemination of
information beyond those in the corporation with a "need to know." 136
Thus, the Diversified court concluded that communications between corporate
attorneys and lower echelon employees would be privileged if:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the re-
quest so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-
ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not dis-
seminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate struc-
ture, need to know its contents."'
The standard thus adds the "need to know" element to Harper, and incorpo-
rates the test in a definite rule.
Like the standard for applying the attorney-client privilege developed in
Duplan, the Diversified standard appropriately focuses on the reasons for the
employee-attorney communication and on the peculiar need of corporate
clients in seeking the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Yet, the Diver-
sified standard goes further, and seeks to prevent the unlimited extension of
the attorney-client privilege made possible by Harper's subject matter test. By
qualifying that standard to require that communications between employee
and attorney not be disseminated beyond those with a need to know of them,
the Diversified standard ensures compliance with the privilege's insistence on
confidentiality. Moreover, by noting the relationship required between an
employee's communication and the rendering of legal advice, the standard
133 Id.
134 Id. Indeed, the court pointed out that absent the privilege, a corporate at-
torney could be confronted with a "Hobson's choice." The court observed, "fiii he
interviews employees not having the 'very highest authority,' their communications to
him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews only those with 'the
very highest authority' he may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine what happened." Id., quoting Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1970).
572 F.2d at 609.
136 Id.
137 Id. The test adopted by Harper is drawn directly from WEINSTEIN, supra note
2 at ¶ 503(b)[041, which in turn drew from a student commentator. Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REV.
360, 378 (1970).
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prevents the funneling of information and documents to an attorney for
permanent protection.E 3 "
The rule announced in Diversified is subject to criticism, however, since
the rule is ambiguous in its definition of corporate superior, 139 and because its
reliance on confidentiality is misdirected. First, a more exact standard is
necessary to ensure that employee communications are not protected merely
because they are made at the direction of an immediately superior employee.
The ambiguous definition of superior might produce a relationship between
the communication and a decision on legal advice too remote to invoke the
privilege's protection. A better approach would define clearly who may re-
quest legal assistance, and require even closer connection between an
employee's communication and a decision on legal advice. This would ensure
the strict construction of the privilege necessary to serve its purpose.'" Simi-
larly, reliance on dissemination of information only to those with a "need to
know" does not adequately guarantee a close relationship between an
employee's communication and a decision on legal advice. It is not the dis-
semination of information that is important for the privilege to attach, but the
nature and substance of the communication—and what is done with it after
transmittal—regardless of who knows it contents. While confidentiality is im-
portant still no connection between the communication and legal advice is
drawn by the modification of Harper's subject matter test suggested in Diver-
sified.
C. The Relationship Approach
In In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 141 the District Court for the District
of Columbia, the third court to attempt a new direction, fashioned a rule
which insisted that a close relationship between an assertedly privileged com-
munication and a decision on legal advice must be demonstrated for the
privilege to attach. 142
 The court devised its new approach in examining
claims of privilege asserted by antitrust defendant Beecham, Inc. for several
'" See text accompanying notes 111-26 SUpro.
13" See 1 1 CONN. L. REv, at 103.
140
 Diversified suffers from two other problems, also noted by student commen-
tators. First, the court apparently ignored the fact that the memoranda in question
contained primarily business, as opposed to legal, advice. 572 F.2d at 610 n.3. See 11
CoNN. L. REV. at 106. More important, however, the Diversified court seriously mis-
states the law with respect to determining whether advice is of a "legal nature." The
court points out that "a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie
so committed for the sake ... legal advice ..." 572 F.2d at 610, quoting WIGMORE,
supra note 1. at § 2296. While this presumption may in fact he appropriate, the Diver-
sified court shifts the burden of the presumption to an inappropriate party. The court
holds the presumption applicable unless a contrary showing is made by the discovering
party. 572 F.2cl at 610. It has long been held, however, that the burden of establishing
the applicability of a privilege is on the asserter. See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at
§§ 2321-22. Indeed, to hold otherwise would truly create a "Hobson's choice." The
discovering party would have to prove the contents of a document in order to discover
the document itself. See 57 N. CAROLINA L. REv. 306, 314-17 (1978).
141 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
' 42 Id, at 385 n.8.
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hundred documents.'" Beecham objected to the report of a Special Master
finding that documents relating to patents were not privileged.'" In uphold-
ing the Master's report the court first reviewed the history of the attorney-
client privilege as applied to corporations."' Noting that both the control
group and subject matter tests had been criticized,' 4 " and concluding that
neither test was sufficient, 147 the court adopted a new standard applying the
privilege to employee-attorney communications only when the communication
was essential to a decision on legal advice.'" This new standard attached the
privilege according to the following rule:
1) The particular employee or representative of the corporation
must have made a communication of information which was reason-
ably believed to be necessary to the decision-making process concerning a
problem on which legal advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of
securing legal advice;
3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee
must have been related to the performance by the employee of the
duties of his employment. 14"
The rule thus insists upon a close relationship between an employee's com-
munication with corporate counsel and a corporate decision on a legal prob.
lei n
The Ampicillin court's reasoning closely parallels that of the court in Dup-
lan in that its principal concern is with the practicalities of the modern cor-
poration.'" The court recognized that corporate counsel require informa-
tion held only by low level employees, and that the privilege should attach
when that information is necessary to prepare solutions to current legal prob-
lems. 15 ' A balance, then, is struck between the need for information and the
"3 Id. at 380.
'" Id. at 383,
143 Id. at 386-87.
143 Id. at 385.
197 Id.
"8 Id. The court carefully explained that, in attempting to relate a communica-
tion to a specific legal problem, the rule should not be dependent on repeated factual
determinations. The court asserted:
the Court does not intend to imply that a communication will only be pro-
tected if it, in fact, contains information necessary to the decision-making
process for a particular legal problem, because such an ex post facto ap-
proach would discourage full disclosure by an employee who may not
know what information is necessary. What is meant is that communication
made in the reasonable belief that they contain such necessary information will be
protected. However, commuications which contain no such reasonable be-
lief, either because of the status of the employee or because of the nature
of the information, will not be protected.
Id. at n.10.
199 Id. at 385.
' 5 ° The court characterized Duplan as the "most well-reasoned" case on the issue
of applying the privilege to corporate clients. Id. at 386.
1 " Id. at 386-87.
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potential for large "zones of silence" ' 52 by examining both the subject matter-
of the communication and the context in which it was made. Unlike Diver-
sified's somewhat ambiguous rule requiring the direction of a superior for a
communication to be protected, Ampicillin insists that the employee know that
his information is needed for a decision on a legal problem. Its rule is precise
in drawing the relationship between an employee's communication and a legal
decision, and most analogous to the individual client. Ampicillin therefore rep-
resents the most clearly focused rule applying the attorney-client privilege to
corporations. The standard's sole failing lies in its omission of a mechanism
for communicating the relationship between required information and the
legal problem to the communicating employee. Although the Ampicillin court.
focused appropriately only on legal problems and the nature of attorney-
employee communications, the standard fails to articulate how corporations
solicit legal advice leading to such conversation. A better approach, defining a
bright line rule, would begin with the initiation of a request. for legal assist-
ance and trace the steps required to relate an employee's communication to a
corporate legal decision.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Ampicillin. and Duplan each reflect an approach to application of the
attorney-client privilege which accomodates the needs and characteristics of
the modern corporation while serving the purpose underlying the attorney-
client privilege. In applying both the control group and subject matter tests
seriatim, Duplan establishes a base point from which application of the privilege
to the corporation qua corporation is possible. Its requirement that the control
group instigate a request for legal advice is useful to establish a reference
point from which further examination of the particular communication is pos-
sible.' 53
 Ampicillin provides the means of examining particular communications.
Its focus on subject matter and context.'" permits the necessary relationship
between the protected communication, a decision on legal advice, and the
purpose of urging corporate clients to seek professional legal help to be
drawn precisely. A test which combines both of these two aspects of Ampicillin
and Duplan to trace all steps required to attach the privilege is therefore rec-
ommended.
A test combining elements of Duplan and Ampicillin would look first to the
source of a corporate request for legal advice, and then relate an employee's
communication to corporate decisions on that advice. Thus, the privilege
should attach if:
(I) individuals with authority to act upon legal advice sought such
advice on behalf of the corporation; (2) the fact that legal advice was
being sought was transmitted to an employee; (3) the employee
communicated with the corporation's attorney (a) concerning a mat-
ter within the scope of his duties of employment, (b) as a result of a
''2
' 5 ' Sec text accompanying note 125 supra.
I' See text accompanying note 151 supra.
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request from corporate officers with authority to act upon legal ad-
vice, and (c) in the reasonable belief that the communication was
necessary to the corporate decision making process on a particular
legal problem; and (4) the communication was not disseminated
beyond those with authority to act upon the legal advice rendered.
The test thus attempts to trace corporation's legal problem from the initiation
stage to the legal decision, and distinctly relates an employee's communication
to corporate legal decision making.
It is submitted that such a standard would neither limit attachment of the
privilege so severely as to discourage corporate managers from seeking legal
advice, nor permit the unlimited extension of the privilege to keep all corpo-
rate affairs permanently secret. Rather, because the test requires that instiga-
tion of requests for legal advice, and instructions that employees speak with
the corporation's attorney, emanate from those officers with authority to act
upon such advice, the standard urges the corporate structure to devote atten-
tion to its legal affairs. Moreover, by providing protection only for those
communications distinctly related to current legal problems and limiting dis-
semination, no funneling of information to attorneys is permitted, and no
artificial limit on attachment of the privilege is established.
The proposed standard also establishes objective and predictable criteria
fOr attorneys and judges to invoke the privilege's protection. Under the pro-
posed test, for example, when a corporation requests its attorney to investigate
alleged wrongdoing and then to advise the corporation regarding possible lia-
bility, both corporate manager and attorney will know if the privilege prop-
erly may be asserted. The attorney first. will look to the source of the request
for legal assistance. If it falls within the group of individuals within the corpo-
ration who may act upon any advice he renders—probably those he deals
with regularly—the attorney may then analyze the individual communication
to be made. If the fact of the request. for legal assistance has been transmitted
to the communicating employee, and if as a result the employee realizes that
his communication is necessary to resolve a legal problem, the privilege may
be invoked. The only remaining requirement, as with all privileges, is that the
communication remain confidential. To ensure this, the attorney must make
certain that only those in authority to act upon his advice learn the substance
of the low level employee's communication. These steps provide an efficient
means of determining applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corpora-
tions. They thus establish a predictable rule which minimizes significant prob-
lems encountered by earlier approaches.
CONCLUSION
Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications between
corporate employees and a firm's attorney have been difficult for three
reasons. First,, courts are divided about the extent to which such communica-
tions should be protected. As a matter of fundamental policy, the established
control group and subject matter standards offer radically different. ap-
proaches. Second, courts have been unsuccessful in closely relating assertedly
privileged communications to the privilege's goal of encouraging corporations
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to solicit professional legal assistance and to the resolution of immediate legal
problems. Finally, even where policy arguments have been isolated, courts
have not established objective criteria upon which predictable invocation of
the privilege may be based. A new approach which extends the privilege in an
appropriate and unambiguous manner, and which distinctly relates corporate
communications to corporate legal decisions is therefore needed.
The test proposed in this note fosters the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege without artificially restricting its extension to corporate communica-
tions. The standard recognizes the needs of modern corporations for intro-
spection and closely relates privileged communications to a decision on a par-
ticular legal problem. In an era where corporate managers increasingly rely
on professional legal advice, and where lawyer's duties to corporate clients are
changing, such a predictable and reasoned standard should be adopted.
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